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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
  
 
 This case presents an interesting question concerning 
the interpretation of a property settlement agreement entered 
into by a husband and wife in anticipation of their divorce, and 
the application of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA), 28 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., to the agreement. On 
February 26, 1992, Joseph W. Hullett filed suit against his ex-
wife, Leslie B. Talcott, in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking, inter alia, a 
declaration that the settlement agreement did not constitute a 
qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) within the meaning of 
ERISA, and an injunction prohibiting payment of any of Hullett's 
pension benefits to Talcott.1   
 Each of the parties subsequently filed cross-motions 
for partial summary judgment.  The district court granted in part 
Hullett's motion for partial summary judgment and denied 
Talcott's motion.  The court held that the settlement agreement 
constitutes a QDRO, and that Talcott is entitled to receive one-
half of the pension benefits which Hullett has accrued as of 
December 31, 1983, the date of the settlement agreement, if she 
remains unmarried at the time Hullett actually retires or is 
required to begin receiving pension benefits.  Talcott timely 
appealed to this court.  We reverse. 
                     
1
.  The district court exercised jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).  This 
court has jurisdiction over this appeal from a final judgment 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
  
 I.  
 Hullett and Talcott were married on August 19, 1961.  
In 1965, Hullett commenced employment with Towers, Perrin, 
Forster & Crosby, Inc. (Towers, Perrin) in its reinsurance 
division.  He thereafter became a manager, stockholder, vice-
president, senior vice-president, a member of the board of 
directors, and a member of the Towers, Perrin executive 
committee. 
 In 1982 or 1983, Hullett and Talcott separated.  On 
December 31, 1983, they entered into a property settlement 
agreement (the Agreement), which William H. Lamb, Esq., drafted.  
The parties' subsequent divorce decree incorporated by reference 
the Agreement as part of the decree.  At the time of the 
separation, Hullett was a fully vested member of Towers, Perrin 
pension plans which consisted of a Retirement Income Plan 
qualified under Section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (Plan 
or Pension Plan) and a non-qualified Retirement Income 
Restoration Plan which had become effective as of January 1, 
1976.  The Agreement provided that in the event that Talcott 
remained unmarried at the time of Hullett's retirement, Hullett 
would pay to her, in the year of his retirement, fifty percent of 
all income received pursuant to his fully vested, accrued pension 
credit under the Plan. 
 By letter dated January 22, 1986, Hullett wrote 
Talcott, contending that the Agreement contained an error in that 
the pension was suppose to be valued as of December 31, 1983, of 
which value Talcott was suppose to receive fifty percent.  
  
Talcott responded that the Agreement was correct as written.  
Hullett's attorney then wrote Lamb seeking to confirm Hullett's 
position and to do the necessary to clarify the Agreement.  In 
response, Lamb's office disputed Hullett's claim.  It emphasized 
that on the original drafts, 100% of all income received from the 
pension plan was to be payable to Talcott upon Hullett's 
retirement and receipt of benefits, but that the valuation date 
was deleted in return for Talcott receiving a full 50% of 
whatever pension was ultimately payable to Hullett.  In December 
of 1986, Hullett informed Larry Margel, Chief Actuary at Towers, 
Perrin, that he had signed an agreement which dealt with his 
whole pension instead of with the pension as valued at December 
31, 1983, and Margel provided Hullett with some arguments 
regarding the situation. 
 On February 5, 1990, Towers, Perrin unilaterally 
terminated Hullett's employment.  As defined in Hullett's Pension 
Plan, he had an early retirement date of January 1, 1991, and a 
normal retirement date of January 1, 2001.  Hullett could receive 
pension benefits as of his early retirement date based upon a 
reduction of benefits of 5% for each year below the normal 
retirement date.  Towers, Perrin and Hullett subsequently entered 
into a Release and Agreement, whereby the parties agreed that 
Hullett would receive a pension equal to the one he would have 
earned under the Plan had he remained employed with Towers, 
Perrin on his early retirement date.2   
                     
2
.  This amounted to a pension under the Pension Plan of 
$7,258.37 per month commencing January 1, 2001, plus a social 
  
 By letter dated August 20, 1991, the administrator for 
the plans, Karl W. Lohwater, determined that the Agreement was a 
QDRO3 within the meaning of ERISA, and that under the terms of 
the Agreement, Talcott was entitled to 50% of all of Hullett's 
pension benefits from both plans, with payment to commence when 
Talcott elected to receive the pension benefits.  Hullett 
appealed this initial determination.  By letter dated January 15, 
1992, the plan administrator made a final determination to 
recognize the Agreement as a QDRO and to pay Talcott 50% of 
Hullett's pension, without regard to any December 31, 1983 
valuation date and without regard to when Hullett decided to 
commence receipt of his share of the pension monies. 
 On February 26, 1992, Hullett filed a complaint against 
Talcott in federal court seeking, inter alia, a declaration that 
the Agreement did not constitute a QDRO, and an injunction 
prohibiting payment of any of Hullett's pension benefits to 
Talcott.  Talcott filed a motion to dismiss Hullett's complaint, 
contending that Hullett had improperly sought de novo review of 
(..continued) 
security supplement under the Plan of $554.14 per month from 
January 1, 2001 through May 31, 2003, plus a supplemental pension 
of $3,220.30 per month commencing January 1, 2001. 
3
.  A QDRO is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i).  Prior to 
1984, ERISA's provisions failed to clearly delineate the interest 
of a non-employee spouse in pension benefits of the employee 
spouse.  Under the 1984 amendments to ERISA, if a domestic 
relations order provides for distribution of part or all of a 
participant's benefits under a qualified pension plan to an 
alternate payee and meets the requirements set forth in the 
statute, then the creation, recognition, or assignment of these 
benefits to the alternate payee is not considered an assignment 
or alienation prohibited by ERISA's spendthrift provisions.  
  
the plan administrator's determination, which the district court 
denied.  Talcott subsequently filed a counterclaim against 
Hullett and a crossclaim against Towers, Perrin, Towers Perrin 
Retirement Plan, and Towers Perrin Pension Restoration Plan 
(collectively, the "Towers, Perrin Defendants"), seeking a 
declaration of the rights of the parties.  The Towers, Perrin 
defendants crossclaimed seeking similar relief.  Talcott also 
filed a motion in limine seeking the introduction of parol 
evidence, which the district court denied.   
 The parties then filed cross-motions for partial 
summary judgment.  The district court granted in part Hullett's 
motion, and denied Talcott's motion regarding the QDRO 
determination but granted relief on other grounds.  The court 
held that the Agreement constituted a QDRO, and that Talcott was 
entitled to receive one-half of the pension benefits which 
Hullett had accrued as of December 31, 1983 if she remains 
unmarried at the time Hullett actually retires or is required to 
begin receiving pension benefits from Towers, Perrin.  Talcott 
filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment and for 
reconsideration, which the district court denied.   
 II. 
 This court exercises plenary review over a grant of 
summary judgment, and we apply the same test the district court 
should have utilized initially.  Oritani Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. 
Fidelity and Deposit Co., 989 F.2d 635, 637 (3d Cir. 1993).  
Summary judgment is appropriate only when it is demonstrated that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving 
  
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-32 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).  An 
issue of material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."  
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  In 
deciding a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences 
must be drawn in favor of the non-movant.  Oritani, 989 F.2d at 
638.   
 For purposes of interpretation, a property settlement 
agreement is treated the same as any other contract under 
Pennsylvania law.  See e.g., Lower v. Lower, 584 A.2d 1028, 1030 
(Pa.Super. 1991).  A court's purpose in examining a contract is 
to interpret the intent of the contracting parties, as 
objectively manifested by them.  Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna 
Business Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1009 (3d Cir. 1980).  The 
process of interpreting a contract requires the court to make a 
preliminary inquiry as to whether the contract before it is 
ambiguous.  Stendardo v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 991 F.2d 
1089, 1094 (3d Cir. 1993).  A contract provision is ambiguous if 
it is susceptible of two reasonable alternative interpretations.  
Mellon, 619 F.2d at 1011.  Where the written terms of the 
contract are not ambiguous and can only be read one way, the 
court will interpret the contract as a matter of law.  Stendardo, 
991 F.2d at 1094.  If the contract is determined to be ambiguous, 
then the interpretation of the contract is left to the 
factfinder, to resolve the ambiguity in light of extrinsic 
evidence.  Id.; Mellon, 619 F.2d at 1011. 
  
 Pennsylvania courts apply the "plain meaning rule" of 
interpretation of contracts which assumes that the intent of the 
parties to an instrument is "embodied in the writing itself, and 
when the words are clear and unambiguous the intent is to be 
discovered only from the express language of the agreement."   
County of Dauphin v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 770 F. Supp. 248, 
251 (M.D.Pa.) (quotation omitted), aff'd, 937 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 
1991).  Nevertheless, a determination whether the language of an 
agreement is unambiguous may not be apparent without examining 
the context in which the agreement arose.  Steuart v. McChesney, 
444 A.2d 659, 662 (Pa. 1982).  Thus, a court is not always 
confined to the four corners of the written document in 
determining whether an ambiguity exists.  Mellon, 619 F.2d at 
1011.  Rather, the judge must "consider the words of the 
contract, the alternative meaning suggested by counsel, and the 
nature of the objective evidence to be offered in support of that 
meaning."  Id. 
 III. 
 We begin our analysis by examining the language of the 
Agreement, which states in relevant part: 
 The retirement income plan listed in Schedule 
"A" is payable to Husband upon his 
retirement.  The parties agree that in the 
event Wife remains unmarried at the time of 
Husband's retirement that fifty percent (50%) 
of all income received pursuant to said 
pension plan shall be paid by Husband to Wife 
in the year of his retirement.  It is 
understood by both parties, that this pension 
benefit is payable to Husband only if he 
survives to his early retirement date of 
January 1, 1991, and Husband, or Husband's 
  
estate, are only bound hereby if Husband does 
so survive. 
 
 * * * 
 
 Schedule "A" 
 
 (1) Seventy (70) shares of Towers, Perrin 
Common Stock with a total current value of 
$63,700.00 on the date of valuation, December 
31, 1983. 
 
 (2) Two thousand three hundred and ten 
(2,310) shares of Towers, Perrin Preferred 
Stock with a total current value of 
$231,000.00 on the date of valuation, 
December 31, 1983. 
 
 (3) Fully vested, accrued pension credit 
under the Towers, Perrin Retirement Income 
Plan (hereinafter referred to as Towers, 
Perrin RIP). 
 The district court found that the above contractual 
language was susceptible to only one interpretation.  The court 
held that Talcott was entitled to 50% of the pension credit 
vested and accrued as of December 31, 1983, the date of the 
Agreement.  In so holding, the court relied on the past tense 
form of the words "vested" and "accrued".  However, this language 
also can be interpreted to refer to the pension credit "vested 
and accrued" at the time of Hullett's retirement.   
 The record in this case shows that the district court 
erred in holding that the language of the Agreement was not 
ambiguous.  The evidence supports as reasonable Talcott's 
alternative interpretation that she was to receive 50% of "all" 
of Hullett's pension, without being limited to only 50% of the 
pension credit vested and accrued at the time of the Agreement.  
  
Schedule A was specific in providing valuation dates for the 
other two assets identified on it, Talcott's share of the common 
and preferred stock, and the body of the Agreement specifically 
states that these assets are valued as of December 31, 1983.  In 
contrast, the parties did not provide a valuation date for the 
Pension Plan.  Lamb, the scrivener of the Agreement, testified 
that the draft version of the Agreement provided that Talcott was 
to receive 100% of the pension valued as of December 31, 1983, 
but that the valuation date was deleted in subsequent drafts and 
the final Agreement in return for Talcott receiving a full 50% of 
whatever pension was ultimately payable to Hullett.  
 Moreover, unlike the pension language, Talcott's 
entitlement to the other assets on Schedule A is in no way 
contingent upon her remaining unmarried.  Talcott argues that 
this is because she was only getting the shares of stock that 
were rightfully hers as of the time of the divorce, but that 
Hullett did not want to continue increasing her share of his 
pension if she then chose to remarry.  This interpretation of the 
contractual language is a reasonable one. 
 The district court observed that its interpretation was 
further supported by Paragraph 12 of the Agreement, which states 
that neither party has any claim to any personal property, 
tangible or intangible, thereafter acquired by the other.  The 
inclusion of Paragraph 12, a standard contractual provision, does 
not preclude Talcott's interpretation of the Agreement as a 
reasonable one.  As testified by the scrivener, Lamb: 
  
 [Paragraph 12 is] a standard clause which is 
intended to cover the situation where after 
this agreement is signed husband goes out and 
buys a car or wife goes out and buys an 
airplane or a townhouse or whatever, neither 
party has any claim on any of those assets 
after this agreement is signed.   
Similarly, the two contractual provisions cited by Hullett, 
concerning the freedom to live apart and engage in any employment 
and the release of claims against each other, are standard 
contractual provisions which serve separate and distinct 
purposes.  These provisions are not inherently inconsistent with 
Talcott's suggested interpretation of the Agreement. 
 The extrinsic evidence presented by Talcott shows that 
her interpretation is a reasonable alternative one, and thus the 
language regarding the amount of pension benefits to which 
Talcott is entitled is ambiguous.  See e.g., Lower, 584 A.2d at 
1032 (holding that failure to define "alimony" and "support" 
created ambiguity to be resolved by factfinder); Lohmann v. 
Piczon, 487 A.2d 1386, 1389 (Pa.Super. 1985) (finding "net income 
after taxes," 25% of which husband was to pay wife, was ambiguous 
as to whether it included any of husband's tax deductions); De 
Witt v. Kaiser, 484 A.2d 121, 126 (Pa.Super. 1984) (finding term 
"income" in context of husband's support obligations to be 
ambiguous, thus requiring extrinsic evidence to define term).  
Therefore, we must remand this case to allow a factfinder to 
resolve the ambiguity in light of the extrinsic evidence. 
 IV. 
  
 The second dispute focuses on the following contractual 
language: 
 The retirement income plan listed in Schedule 
"A" is payable to Husband upon his 
retirement.  The parties agree that in the 
event Wife remains unmarried at the time of 
Husband's retirement that fifty percent (50%) 
of all income received pursuant to said 
pension plan shall be paid by Husband to Wife 
in the year of his retirement.  It is 
understood by both parties, that this pension 
benefit is payable to Husband only if he 
survives to his early retirement date of 
January 1, 1991, and Husband, or Husband's 
estate, are only bound hereby if Husband does 
so survive. 
 The district court attempted to examine the use of the 
word "retirement" as used in the Plan to determine what the 
parties meant, but found that the Plan does not provide a single 
definition of the word.  Rather, the Plan describes three 
separate retirement dates, early, normal, and postponed.  The 
court thus turned back to the Agreement to determine which 
definition the parties intended to control.  The court concluded 
that the parties intended that Talcott be entitled to her 
benefits when Hullett elects to and does receive his pension 
benefits, or when he is required to commence receipt of his 
pension benefits under the terms of the Plan, in the event that 
Talcott remains unmarried at that time.  
 Before the district court, Hullett argued that Talcott 
is entitled to 50% of the pension benefits which he accrued prior 
to December 31, 1983, only if she remains unmarried at the time 
he actually retires from the workplace in general.  On appeal, 
  
Hullett now adopts the district court's interpretation of the 
Agreement. 
 Talcott argues that the district court misconstrued the 
Agreement, and notes that the use of the term "retirement" in the 
Agreement directly follows a sentence in which the parties 
defined retirement as that point at which the retirement income 
plan was "payable" to Hullett.  She contends that "payable" means 
the point at which the money may be paid on demand, not the point 
at which payment actually commences.  See Black's Law Dictionary 
(5th ed. 1979) at 1016 (defining payable as "[c]apable of being 
paid; suitable to be paid; admitting or demanding payment; justly 
due; legally enforceable").  Talcott asserts that this date would 
be January 1, 1991, when Hullett reached his early retirement 
date under the Plan, and that the court erred in construing the 
Agreement to empower Hullett to hold her pension money hostage to 
her remaining unmarried until he turns 60, in the year 2001.  
Talcott describes various scenarios where the district court's 
interpretation of the Agreement could cause her to lose all or 
part of her share in the pension benefits.  Thus, Talcott argues, 
because she remained unmarried at the time of Hullett's 
retirement from Towers, Perrin, she is presently entitled to her 
50% share of pension benefits, whatever they might be, and she is 
free to remarry. 
 Again, Talcott's interpretation of the contractual 
language is a reasonable alternative one.  It is clear that the 
parties did not foresee or provide for Hullett terminating his 
employment with Towers, Perrin prior to when he was entitled to 
  
his pension benefits.  Thus, the contractual language is 
ambiguous, and its interpretation should be left to the 
factfinder to resolve in light of any extrinsic evidence the 
parties may present on remand. 
 V. 
 The parties' final dispute concerns the district 
court's appropriate standard of review of the plan 
administrator's determinations.  In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 
v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989), the United States Supreme Court 
held that challenges under section 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA are to 
be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the plan gives the 
administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility 
for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.  Id. at 115.  
Where a plan administrator is given discretionary authority to 
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of 
the plan, the appropriate standard of review of the 
administrator's determinations is an arbitrary and capricious 
standard.  Id. at 114-15.  Discretionary powers need not be 
expressly granted; they may be implied by the plan's terms.  Luby 
v. Teamsters Health Welfare & Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 
1181 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 Neither party has appealed the district court's ruling 
that the Agreement constitutes a QDRO, and therefore it is not 
necessary for this court to determine whether the district court 
erred in reviewing de novo the plan administrator's finding that 
the Agreement is a QDRO.  The district court did not err in 
holding that it should review de novo the plan administrator's 
  
construction of the Agreement, which involved issues of contract 
interpretation under the Agreement and not the Plan.  However, as 
discussed above, the Agreement is ambiguous and thus the issues 
of the amount of Talcott's share of pension benefits, the time of 
Hullett's retirement, and the effect of Talcott's marital status 
are for the factfinder to resolve on remand in light of the 
extrinsic evidence. 
 Additionally, the district court erred in refusing to 
give  deference to the plan administrator's determination that he 
would segregate Talcott's QDRO monies and commence payment at the 
time she elects to receive her share.  That is, when Talcott 
elects to begin her benefit payments, the administrator will 
calculate the amount she is entitled to receive by making an 
actuarial calculation converting the present value of one half of 
Hullett's pension, valued as of the date determined by the 
factfinder, to a pension payable over Talcott's lifetime.  In 
contrast, the court held that Talcott may continue receiving 
monthly benefits only as long as Hullett receives them pursuant 
to the Plan.   
 In making his determination regarding the distribution 
of payments, the plan administrator exercised his discretionary 
authority to construe the terms of the Plan.  Section 8.1(h) of 
the Plan provides, "If the [plan administer] receives a QDRO with 
respect to a Member's divorce from his Spouse, it will comply 
with such Order and reduce the benefits otherwise payable to or 
on behalf of such Member under this Plan or the Actuarial 
Equivalent of any benefits payable to his Spouse under this Plan 
  
pursuant to such QDRO."  Additionally, the Plan Procedures for 
Domestic Relations Orders provides that any amount that would be 
payable to an alternate payee under a QDRO will be separately 
accounted for under the Plan and will remain segregated while the 
plan participant or alternate payee appeals the administrator's 
QDRO determination.  At the end of this appeal period, "the 
segregated amounts, adjusted for investment results, will be paid 
to the plan participant or the alternate payee (or credited to 
the account of the plan participant or alternate payee) in 
accordance with the determination of the [plan administrator]."  
Thus, the district court erred in refusing to give deference to 
the administrator's holding that Talcott's pension is payable 
over her lifetime, and instead holding that payments to Talcott 
will terminate when Hullett's pension payments terminate.  The 
court was required to uphold the administrator's determination as 
to QDRO payments unless it was arbitrary and capricious.  It was 
not.  
 In summary, the district court erred by granting in 
part Hullett's motion for partial summary judgment.  Talcott has 
presented reasonable alternative interpretations of the 
contractual language regarding the distribution of Hullett's 
pension and the provision requiring payment upon Hullett's 
retirement if Talcott remains unmarried.  Thus, these provisions 
are ambiguous and are appropriate for a factfinder's resolution 
upon remand.  Finally, although the district court properly 
reviewed the plan administrator's interpretation of the Agreement 
on a de novo basis, it erred in refusing to give deference to the 
  
plan administrator's determination regarding the payment of 
benefits under the QDRO.   
 VI. 
 Accordingly, the district court's grant of partial 
summary judgment in favor of Hullett will be reversed and the 
case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
